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Abstract: The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal
Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding
about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inﬂa-
tion forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic diﬀerences in individual
inﬂation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based
on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown
that non-voters systematically overpredict inﬂation relative to the consen-
sus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inﬂation if the
favor looser policy. These ﬁndings are consistent with non-voting member
following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use
their forecast to inﬂuence policy deliberation.
Keywords: inﬂation forecast, forecast errors, monetary policy, monetary
committee, Federal Reserve
JEL classiﬁcation: E43, E52
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At almost all major central banks monetary policy is set not by a single decision maker
but by a monetary policy committee of experts. At the U.S. Federal Reserve, for
example, monetary policy decisions are taken by the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC). These committees often consist of members with heterogeneous preferences,
diﬀerent backgrounds and career concerns as well as diﬀerent regional and institutional
aﬃliations. Only recently, the diversity of committee members’ preferences and views
is studied in the academic literature.2 A number of studies, for example, studies
the pattern of formal dissent of FOMC members, the role of the chairman for policy
deliberation, and the diﬀerences between outsiders and insiders.3
An important aspect of policymaking by committees in the presence of heterogeneity
is strategic behavior of committee members. One aspect where strategic behavior is
likely to surface is the process of forecasting inﬂation. Although the Federal Reserve
is not an oﬃcial inﬂation targeter, its inﬂation forecast is likely to be important for
communication with the public. Strategic behavior of members in this forecasting
process has only been studied very recently by Ellison and Sargent (2009), whose
important contribution will be discussed below. This paper closes this gap. A re-
cent compilation of data on individual inﬂation forecasts by each FOMC members
allows the researcher to investigate whether members use their forecast to give the
policy debate a twist in a particular direction. Take as an example a member that
is hawkish on inﬂation. Will this member submit a somewhat higher inﬂation rate
than the remaining members in order to gear policy towards tightening? The crucial
cross-sectional property to identify strategic behavior is the right to vote on inter-
est rate policy that rotates across members. We understand strategic forecasting as
a systematic relationship between the inﬂation forecast and the voting status. The
2See Blinder (2009) for a recent survey on the the implications of alternative designs of monetary
policy committees for interest rate policy.
3A complete survey of the literature is beyond the scope of this paper. To give just a few references,
see Blinder and Morgan (2005), Chappell et al. (2007), and Gerlach-Kristen (2008) for research on
the role of the chairman in monetary policy committees. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) ﬁnd in an
empirical analysis that the consensus voting model ﬁts most central bank policies best. Meade (2005)
and Gerlach-Kristen and Meade (2010) study the incentives for formal dissent by FOMC members.
Meade and Stasavage (2008) ﬁnd that releasing transcripts of FOMC meetings changes the incentive
for dissent. Gerlach-Kristen (2009) shows interesting diﬀerences between outsiders and insiders in the
Bank of England’s monetary policy committee in the pattern of dissent and their policy preferences.
2assumption is that using the inﬂation forecast to inﬂuence policy deliberations and
communication is more attractive for non-voting members that for voting members.
To uncover strategic behavior of FOMC members, therefore, we exploit the rotating
nature of members’ voting rights. The underlying assumption is that strategic motives
are more relevant for members without the right to vote on interest rate policy. These
members should instead use their semiannual forecast to inﬂuence policy deliberation.
The empirical strategy identiﬁes systematic diﬀerences between voters and non-voters
in their forecasting behavior. It is shown that non-voters deviate more strongly from
the forecast consensus in the direction consistent with their interest rate preference.
Non-voters who expressed a preference for a looser policy stance systematically submit
forecasts lower than the committees average forecast. Non-voters with a preference
for a policy tightening, in contrast, systematically exceed the forecast consensus by
about 20 basis points.
While strategic behavior of macroeconomic forecasters received some attention in
the literature, the issue of strategic forecasting of FOMC members has not yet been
studied due to the non-availability of data. The compilation of individual forecasts
submitted by each FOMC member for selected years by Romer (2009) makes it pos-
s i b l et ot a k eaﬁrst step into this direction. Thus far only the range of forecasts are
published, not the individual numbers.
This paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the related literature is given
in section two. Section three presents the data set on individual FOMC inﬂation
forecasts. The empirical strategy and the results are discussed in section four. Section
ﬁve draws some tentative conclusions.
2 The literature on strategic forecasting
The literature provides evidence supporting the notion of strategic behavior of macro-
economic forecasters. Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) ﬁnd that professional fore-
casters whose wage depend most on publicity produce forecasts that diﬀer most from
the consensus. Lamont (2002) and Pons-Novell (2003) test the cross-sectional impli-
cations of theories of strategic forecasting. The null hypothesis is that the dispersal
of forecasts is unrelated to the forecaster’s age or other measures of reputation or
career concerns. They ﬁnd that as forecasters become older and more established,
they produce more radical forecasts. Based on a panel of Japanese GDP forecasts,
3Ashiya (2009) ﬁnds that forecasters are concerned about publicity when submitting
their forecast. Based on the method of Bernhardt et al. (2006), Pierdzioch et al.
(2010) test for strategic behavior of oil-price forecasters. They ﬁnd evidence of anti-
herding, i.e. forecasts are systematically biased away from the forecast consensus.
Evidence against a rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts due to reputational or
ﬁnancial incentives is presented by Batchelor (2007).4
As mentioned in the introduction, strategic forecasting of policymakers has not yet
received particular attention - mostly due to the non-availability of data. Nevertheless,
three papers are particularly relevant in this context. First, Capistran (2008) points
to systematic forecast errors of Greenbook forecasts. He oﬀers an explanation in terms
of an asymmetric loss function for forecasters. He ﬁnds that in the post-Volcker era
the Fed’s cost of under-predicting inﬂation was four times the cost of over-predicting.
Second, the recent note by McCracken (2010) is close to this paper. He also pursues
the idea of strategic forecasting on the FOMC and argues that hawkish members have
an incentive to forecast high inﬂation in order to underlie the need for tighter policy.
He ﬁnds that for inﬂation, the midpoint of the trimmed range, i.e. the outlier-adjusted
range, is more accurate that the midpoint of the full range. Put diﬀerently, controlling
for outliers improves the accuracy of the FOMC’s inﬂation forecast. Arguably, the
behavior described by McCracken (2010) is more relevant for non-voters than for
voters. To uncover strategic behavior of FOMC members, therefore, we exploit the
rotating nature of members’ voting rights. While McCracken (2010) uses the range of
forecasts, we base our study on a data set with individual inﬂation forecasts recently
made available.
Third, Ellison and Sargent (2009) argue that aggregate FOMC forecasts are not meant
to be accurate descriptions of the most likely future inﬂation outcome, but rather
worst-case scenarios used to guide policy in the presence of model misspeciﬁcations.
Policymakers put greater weight on adverse outcomes, i.e. inﬂation being further away
from target, than the staﬀ or external forecasters. We can conclude from this study
that, ﬁrst, inﬂation forecasts matter as an important input for policy and, second, that
individual FOMC members might use these forecasts strategically according to their
own degree of model uncertainty which is not necessarily shared by fellow members.
4Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) provide evidence in favor of behavioral models explaining the
forecast bias. A theoretical model of strategic behavior of professional forecasters is developed by
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005).
43F O M C f o r e c a s t s
Monetary policy in the U.S. is set by the Federal Open Market Committee. It consists
of the Washington D.C. based governors of the Federal Reserve board, the Chairman
of the board of governors and the Presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks.
While all regional presidents take an active part in the policy deliberation, the formal
voting right rotates across Federal Reserve districts. Only the board members, the
chairman and, as an exception to the rotation scheme, the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York are always eligible to cast a vote on monetary policy.
While only a subgroup of members votes on interest rate policy, all FOMC members
regularly submit forecasts for important macroeconomic variables including the rate
of inﬂation. This rotating voting right is the decisive pattern used in this paper to
identify strategic motives in forecasting.
Twice a year at its February and July meetings the FOMC publishes the monetary
policy report to congress (Humphrey-Hawkins report).5 Each FOMC member submits
her own forecasts, after intensive brieﬁng by the Board staﬀ. Until recently, however,
individual forecasts were kept secret. The published report only contains a range of
forecasts and the midpoint of this range, also known as the central tendency.6
Recently, the Fed makes data on individual FOMC forecasts available for selected
years. Based on these releases, Romer (2009) constructs a data set containing forecasts
for the period 1992-1998.7 The data set contains forecasts from board members as
well as from voting and non-voting regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents. It does
not, however, contain forecasts from the chairman.
In the July report, the FOMC prepares forecasts ﬁve quarters ahead and one quarter
ahead. The February report contains forecasts for the variables three quarters ahead.
The inﬂation forecast is the expected fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter change of the
Consumer Price Index. All forecasts are supposed to be conditional on each member’s
5Recently, the frequency was increased to four forecasts per year.
6These data received some attention in recent years. Gavin (2003) evaluates the information
content of the central tendency and the FOMC’s forecasting record, while Gavin and Mandal (2003)
compare forecast accuracy between the FOMC, the private sector, and the staﬀ.L i k e w i s e , R o m e r
and Romer (2008) contrast FOMC forecasts with Federal Reserve staﬀ forecasts. Gavin and Pande
(2008) use data from the survey of professional forecasters to mimic the FOMC’s forecasting method
and analyse the diﬀerent measures of forecast consensus.
7All data series about FOMC forecasts used in this paper are available at David Romer’s website
under http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/.
5own judgement of the "appropriate policy" path over the forecast horizon.
For each of the three diﬀerent forecasts per year, i.e. one at the February meeting
and two at the July meeting, the data set contains forecasts for inﬂation for seven
years and 18 FOMC members. Since a couple of FOMC seats were vacant in the
sample period and we cut the sample to match the data on member speciﬁcp o l i c y
preferences discussed below, we end with about 100 inﬂation forecasts for each forecast
horizon ranging from 1992 to 1997. Certainly, the short time period remains a serious
restriction to empirical research.
4 Empirical strategy and results
The basic idea of this paper is that members’ inﬂation forecasts are in line with their
policy preferences and that, most importantly, this link is stronger for nonvoting
than for voting members. To test this hypothesis, we proceed in two steps. First,
we test whether deviations from the committee’s consensus forecast can be explained
by each participant’s voting status. Second, we go one step further and ask whether
deviations are related to each member’s voiced preference for the monetary policy
stance and, most importantly, whether this relationship is particularly relevant for
non-voting members. While voting members can use their vote and, related to this,
their increased media and policy attention to aﬀect policy, non-voters might resort to
strategic forecasting.8
Let us ﬁrst study the nature of deviations of forecasts from the FOMC’s consensus
forecast. We construct the empirical speciﬁcation along the lines of Lamont (2002)
and Pons-Novell (2003, 2004). Let 
+ denote member ’s period  forecast for
inﬂation  quarters ahead. The mean forecast for the remaining committee members,
that is all members apart from member ,i s
 +. To the extent non-voters
use their forecast in order to inﬂuence policy deliberation, their forecast should be
further away from the consensus forecast than the forecast of voting members. We
test this by regressing the absolute diﬀerence between 
+ and 
 + on a




¯ ¯ = 0 + 1
 +  (1)
8In fact, Hayo et al. (2008) show that voting members’ public speeches aﬀect ﬁnancial markets
more than non-voting members’.
6where 
 takes a value of one if member  is a non-voting member and is zero
otherwise.
The results of this speciﬁcation for three alternative forecast horizons are presented
in table (1). We also report results for two narrower groups of members containing (i)
only regional Federal Reserve bank presidents and (ii) excluding the president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York who does not participate in the rotation scheme.
The results are mixed. For the three quarters-ahead forecasts we consistently ﬁnd
1  0, i.e. a larger deviation from the consensus for non-voters. The diﬀerence
between non-voters and voters, although substantial, is not statistically signiﬁcant.9
One straightforward reason for the insigniﬁcant results is the fact that speciﬁcation (1)
cannot distinguish whether non-voting members have a preference for looser or tighter
policy and, hence, under- or overpredict inﬂation relative to the consensus forecast.
In fact, in this speciﬁcation diﬀerences in the direction of strategic forecasting are
washed out.
Therefore, in a second step we enrich the model by including a measure of the policy
preferences, 
−1, for each member. This is the decisive diﬀerence of this
paper to other contributions with respect to the literature on strategic forecasting.
Most studies on the behavior of professional macroeconomic forecasters can only
relate absolute deviations from the consensus to individual characteristics of forecaster
. They cannot, however, distinguish a rationale for overpredicting inﬂation from a
motive for underprediction.
To avoid an endogeneity problem, the measure of policy preferences is derived from
member ’s voiced preferences at the preceding meeting, i.e. at the December meet-
ing for the  =3forecasts submitted in February and at the May meeting for the










The interaction term is crucial. If 3  0, nonvoting members adjust their forecast
stronger into the direction of intended policy than voters do. This would be consistent
with strategic forecasting. Obviously, measuring policy preferences on an individual
9Consistent with these ﬁndings, Banternghansa and McCracken (2009) show only weak evidence
for the conjecture that the level of disagreement among FOMC members varies with the voting status.
7level is diﬃcult. Here we utilize the data set constructed by Meade (2005).10 She uses
transcripts of FOMC meetings and codes verbally stated preferences into a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if a member favors tighter policy, -1 in case of policy
easing and zero otherwise. Hence we have a variable at hand that ﬁts our purpose of
indicating the preferences for interest rate policy for each FOMC member very well.
Due to some data problems the samples do not perfectly overlap. Hence, we loose a
handful of observations.11
The results are reported in table (2). The policy preference does not have an impact
on forecasts per se. In other words, members cast a sincere forecast that is unrelated
to their preferences. In all speciﬁcations, however, we ﬁnd 3  0.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
non-voters adjust their forecasts in the intended direction. Take the three quarter-
ahead forecast submitted at the February meeting. The policy preference dummy is
not signiﬁcant in general. For non-voters, however, it is strongly signiﬁcant. Non-
voters who favor tighter policy submit a forecast that is about 20 basis points, i.e.
2 +3, higher than voters. Put diﬀerently, take two hawkish members that diﬀer in
their voting status. The nonvoting member is more likely to submit a more pessimistic
(i.e. higher) inﬂation forecast relative to the consensus than the voting member.
As a robustness check, we use two alternative measures of forecast consensus. The
ﬁrst is the median forecast of inﬂation across members, see table (3). All results
are qualitatively unchanged. Since all FOMC members have access to the latest set
of Federal Reserve staﬀ forecasts collected in the Greenbook, it seems natural to
interpret the Greenbook inﬂation forecast as the consensus benchmark. Hence, in a
second alternative speciﬁcation, whose results are presented in table (4), we replace




 + as the dependent variable. The results are similar to the
speciﬁcations presented before. In two-thirds of the estimated forecast equations we
ﬁnd 3  0.
Taken together, the results are consistent with nonvoting members behaving strategi-
cally when submitting the inﬂation forecast in order to aﬀect policy deliberation and
communication. These ﬁndings also lend support to the hypothesis of McCracken
10This data set is available unter http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/past/2005/.
11An alternative to using the preferences for interest rate adjustment would be to employ prefer-
ences for the bias announcement issued after each meeting. However, as Meade (2005) argues, this is
very diﬃcult to code from the transcripts. Often membersd on o td i s c u s st h eb i a si nt h e i rs t a t e m e n t s
at all.
8(2010), who argues that controlling the range of forecasts for outliers improves fore-
cast accuracy due to non-sincere forecasting behavior.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper used inﬂation forecasts from individual FOMC members to test whether
forecasts vary systematically with a member’s voting status. Is was shown that non-
voting members formulate the inﬂation forecast in line with their policy preferences,
i.e. they forecast higher inﬂation if they have a preference for policy tightening.
Forecasts from voting members, in contrast, show no systematic relationship with
policy preferences. Non-voters tend to submit more extreme forecasts in order to
inﬂuence policy decision and communication. Hence, we provide evidence on strategic
forecasting of FOMC members.
This ﬁnding is relevant not only for assessing the forecasting performance of policy-
makers, but also for the broader issue of the design of monetary policy committees.
The ECB, for example, recently released information about the implementation of the
rotation scheme for voting rights in the Governing Council.12 With the enlargement
of the Euro area in the future the size of the committee would, under the present
scheme, become too large to ensure timely and eﬃcient decisions. Therefore, a fairly
complex rotation scheme will be introduced. With only one month, however, the
rotation period, will be very short compared to the Federal Reserve. The results pre-
sented in this paper suggest that a rotation scheme will give rise to strategic behavior
of policymakers.
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12Table 1: Forecast deviations of voting and non-voting FOMC members
forecasters horizon estimates # obs.
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¯ ¯. Results from pooled least-
squares estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.
13Table 2: Deviations from mean forecast and policy preferences of voting and non-
voting FOMC members
forecasters horizon estimates # obs.
0 1 2 3

















































































Notes: The dependent variable is 
+ − 
 +. Results from pooled least-
squares estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.
14Table 3: Deviations from median forecast and policy preferences of voting and non-
voting FOMC members
forecasters horizon estimates # obs.
0 1 2 3





















































































Notes: The dependent variable is 
+ − 
 +. Results from pooled least-
squares estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.
15Table 4: Deviations from Greenbook forecasts and policy preferences of voting and
non-voting FOMC members
forecasters horizon estimates # obs.
0 1 2 3

















































































Notes: The dependent variable is 
+ − 

 +. Results from pooled least-
squares estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.
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